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ABSTRACT
”Feint Aack”, as a new type of APT aack, has become the focus
of aention. It adopts a multi-stage aacks mode which can be
concluded as a combination of virtual aacks and real aacks. Un-
der the cover of virtual aacks, real aacks can achieve the real
purpose of the aacker, as a result, it oen caused huge losses
inadvertently. However, to our knowledge, all previous works use
common methods such as Causal-Correlation or Cased-based to
detect outdated multi-stage aacks. Few aentions have been paid
to detect the ”Feint Aack”, because the diculty of detection lies
in the diversication of the concept of ”Feint Aack” and the lack of
professional datasets, many detection methods ignore the semantic
relationship in the aack. Aiming at the existing challenge, this
paper explores a new method to solve the problem. In the aack
scenario, the fuzzy clustering method based on aribute similarity
is used to mine multi-stage aack chains. en we use a few-shot
deep learning algorithm (SMOTE&CNN-SVM) and bidirectional
Recurrent Neural Network model (Bi-RNN) to obtain the ”Feint
Aack” chains. ”Feint Aack” is simulated by the real aack in-
serted in the normal causal aack chain, and the addition of the
real aack destroys the causal relationship of the original aack
chain. So we used Bi-RNN coding to obtain the hidden feature of
”Feint Aack” chain. In the end, our method achieved the goal to
detect the ”Feint Aack” accurately by using the LLDoS1.0 and
LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017 of Canadian Institute for
Cybersecurity.
KEYWORDS
multi-stage aack, Feint Aack, fuzzy clustering, few-shot learning,
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1 INTRODUCTION
Under the background of the rapid development of global network
informationization, the hidden, pervasive and targeted Advanced
Persistent reat (APT) poses a growing threat to various high-
level information security systems [15]. APT aacks are increasing
which target to national and enterprise network information sys-
tems and data security face severe challenges. In March 2011, at the
6th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security
(ICIW), three security researchers at Lockheed Martin proposed an
Intrusion Kill Chain (IKC) [4]. From the perspective of intrusion
detection, they decompose the aack process into seven steps: re-
connaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation,
command and control (C2), and actions on objectives. is model
redenes the kill chain in the military eld to cyberspace security,
providing us with new ideas for solving APT aacks [21] [9].
However, at the end of 2017, Trend Micro pointed out that there
has been a new type of APT aack named ”Feint Aack” [10]. It not
only uses the same aack, but also makes full use of two separate
malware aacks. One aack (Virtual aack) is responsible for dis-
tracting and masking the malicious activity of another aack (Real
aack) to provide a way to further infect or steal data and intel-
lectual property. Enterprise IT Security Risk Survey Report pointed
out that the above-mentioned virtual aacks are oen distributed
denial of service (DDoS) aacks [5]. rough analysis of security
experts, these DDoS aacks are only ”smoke bombs” that aacks
use to cover their real aacks. Some enterprises that have suered
DDoS aacks nding that DDoS aacks are only part of the overall
network aack, accounting for only 29% of the total aack time.
When a DDoS aack occurs, the enterprise’s security department
must try to quickly restore normal access services because the
normal external access of the enterprise is denied or interrupted.
erefore, during the DDoS aack, security departments are oen
required to go all out to solve the DDoS aack problem, and then
the aacker ”make a feint to the east but aack in the west” and
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cannot take into account the other intrusion. Aer the ”Feint At-
tack”, 25% of companies will lose important data at the same time.
As it turns out, in order to improve the eciency of aackers, an
aacker oen launches a variety of other forms of aack when
launching a DDoS aack. erefore, once a company is found to be
aacked by DDoS, it must understand the full threat situation and
be ready to handle multiple types of network aacks, otherwise it
is likely to suer greater losses. e Trend Micro report predicted
that such aacks will become more common in 2018.
e ”Feint Aack” mode has received extensive aention in
the eld of cyberspace security. However, in the face of special
aacks, how to carry out related detection and defense work is still
a problem. e detection of multi-stage aack mode at home and
abroad is currently in the key research stage. is paper mainly
focuses on the special aack mode of ”Feint Aack”, and proposes
a detection model based on fuzzy clustering in alert correlation and
Bi-RNN algorithm. e main contributions are as follows:
(1) Replaying the trac packet of the LLDoS 1.0 and LLDoS2.0
of DARPA2000 intrusion detection aack scenario [14] and
the trac packet (.pcap) of Intrusion Detection Evaluation
Dataset (CICIDS2017) [7] [20] through snort, generating
the raw alert data, further based on the ve-tuple (Aack-
Type, S IP, D IP, S Port, D Port) performs alert aggregation.
e main purpose is to reduce the duplicate alert data of
the same aack event, and use the fuzzy clustering based
on aribute similarity to process the raw alert aer aggre-
gation. Multi-stage aack chains are mined in the aack
scenario to form a multi-stage aack mode comparison
library.
(2) We improved the traditional deep learning algorithm, CI-
CIDS2017 dataset in our experiment is preprocessed by the
imbalanced learning strategy. We used the deep convolu-
tional neural network to learn the new feature representa-
tion of the dataset. en the few-shot learning is performed
by the hierarchical SVM classier. e classication re-
sult was dened and divided the virtual aacks and real
aacks with the condence level. Finally, we constructed
the dataset of virtual aacks and real aacks, which is the
basic element library of the ”Feint Aack” chain.
(3) Using the multi-stage aack and element aack event li-
brary obtained in the rst and second stages, our method
of aack chain recovery technology based on Bi-RNN. Ac-
cording to the method, ”Feint Aack” is simulated by the
real aack inserted in the normal causal aack chain, and
the addition of the real aack destroys the causal relation-
ship of the original aack chain. e hidden feature is
obtained by Bi-RNN coding. Further we classied the two
types of trainable samples. Finally, our work achieved the
purpose of detecting the ”Feint Aack” accurately.
e structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will
discuss the related work in this eld. Section 3 will present ”Feint
Aack” chains construction and detection methods through ”Feint
Aack” chains model. Section 4 gives experimental and results.
Finally, conclusion is showed in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review the related work about approaches that de-
tect multi-stage aacks using IDS alerts. Generally, the approaches
may be classied into two categories, namely causal correlation
analysis and cluster correlation analysis.
Causal Correlation Analysis
e causal alert correlation method associates the alert informa-
tion according to the causal dependence between the aacks. If
the result of one aack behavior creates a precondition for another
aack behavior, it is considered that there is a causal dependence
between the two aack behaviors, and the causal relationship is
utilized. Nguyen et al. [16] conducted an empirical game analysis of
the multi-stage interaction between the aacker and the defender to
obtain a heuristic strategy under the Bayesian aack graph model.
Haas et al. [8] proposed a graph-based alert association (GAC) algo-
rithm to isolate aacks and identify aack scenarios, and assemble
multi-stage aacks from a large set of alerts. Pei et al. [17] proposed
a method which model multi-stage intrusion analysis as a commu-
nity discovery problem analysis system, and discovers any ”aack
communities” embedded within the graphs. A novel method based
on the Hidden Markov Model is proposed to predict multi-stage
aacks using IDS alerts by Holgado et al. [11] ey consider the
hidden states as similar phases of a particular type of aack. Kati-
pally et al. [12] use data mining to process alarms and input the
processed data into the hidden Markov model (HMM), ultimately
achieving the purpose of analyzing and predicting the behavior of
the aacker.
Cluster Correlation Analysis
e clustering alert correlation method associates alert infor-
mation with some identical or similar features, that is, clustering
by the similarity between alert aribute values, such as the same
destination address, the same aack source, aack means, etc. Ah-
madianramaki et al. [1] proposed a three-layer processing frame-
work that uses causal knowledge to correlate alerts, automatically
extracts causal relationships between alerts, builds the aack sce-
nario using Bayesian networks. And further predict the most likely
next aack behavior. Barzegar et al. [3] proposed approach recon-
structs aack scenarios by reasoning based on the evidences in
the alert stream. e main idea of the proposed approach is to
identify the causal relation between alerts using their similarity.
Alvarenga et al. [2] approach applies process mining techniques on
alerts to extract information regarding the aackers behavior and
the multi-stage aack strategies they adopted. e strategies are
presented to the network administrator in friendly high-level visual
models. Large and visually complex models that are dicult to
understand are clustered into smaller, simpler and intuitive models
using hierarchical clustering techniques.
Bidirectional RNN
RNN is used in the eld of natural language processing and its
main purpose is to process and predict sequence data [13]. e
neural network memorizes the previous information, stores it in
the internal state of the network, and applies it to the calculation of
the current output, that is, the nodes between the hidden layers are
no longer connected but connected, and the hidden layer e input
contains not only the output of the input layer but also the output
of the hidden layer at the previous moment. In the classical cyclic
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neural network, the state of the transmission is one-way from the
back. e bidirectional RNN [18] can memorize and encode the
context information, and the subject structure is the combination
of two unidirectional RNNs. At each time t , the input is provided to
both RNNs in opposite directions, and the output is determined by
the two unidirectional RNNs (which can be spliced or summed, etc.).
In this paper, the Bi-RNN algorithm is introduced into the coding
part of the multi-stage aack sequence. In the multi-stage aack
scenario, an aack chain can be analogized into a sequence. Each
atomic aack is equivalent to one word. By encoding the aack
sequence through Bi-RNN, the causal association of the aack
sequence can be preserved to the greatest extent, and achieve the
goal of reducing the dimension.
e multi-stage aack detection based on causal correlation
requires a large amount of expert knowledge to support, and the ac-
quisition of expert knowledge is very dicult, and can not discover
new aack behavior. In this paper, the fuzzy clustering method
based on aribute similarity is used to mine the multi-stage aack
mode. e previous work of detection of the multi-stage aack
chain does not consider the special type of ”Feint Aack” chain,
and the length of the constructed aack chain is too long, which
makes it dicult to retain its inherent causal relationship in further
analysis and pre-processing. erefore, our research is based on
previous work. It mainly achieve the goal of dening and dividing
virtual aacks and real aacks, builds the aack chain based on
causal correlation and Bi-RNN model, further obtains the trainable
aack sample set, and nally obtains the aack chain detection
classier through training.
3 ”FEINT ATTACK” CHAINS CONSTRUCTION
AND DETECTION METHOD
In order to achieve the ”Feint Aack” chain detection based on the
virtual aack chain and real aack chain, we try to solve the prob-
lem through proposed new detection method in this section which
mainly utilizes fuzzy clustering and Bi-RNN algorithm. e input
to our model is raw data stream (e packet format is .dump and
.pcap) of LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017
of Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, and the output is the result
of the classier for detect ”Feint Aack”. at is, whether there is a
”Feint Aack” behavior in a multi-stage aack sequence. We will
describe in detail the implementation of each algorithm proposed
in this paper, and show how to achieve our model to construct and
detect the ”Feint Aack” chain. Framework of bidirectional RNN
based few-shot training for detecting multi-stage aack model is
shown in Figure 1.
Using the captured real-time data packet or replaying the classi-
cal aack dataset by snort to obtain the raw alerts. e multi-stage
aack mode is mined by the fuzzy clustering method based on
aribute similarity, and the virtual aack and real aack are de-
ned and divided by the few-shot deep learning model [6]. e
real aack is embedded into the aack chain by Bi-RNN coding,
and the ”Feint Aack” chain is constructed. Further we classied
the two types of trainable samples. Finally, our work achieved the
purpose of detecting the ”Feint Aack” accurately.
Figure 1: Framework of ”Feint Attack” Chains Construction
and Detection Method.
3.1 Alert Correlation Based on Fuzzy
Clustering
Definition 1. IDS alert is a kind of alert generated when aack
operations occur. It shows security situation of the entire network. We
represent IDS alert as alert = a1,a2, ...an , where ai indicates the ith
alert and is a nine-tuple:
ai = (Timestamp, Protocal , S IP ,D IP , S Port ,D Port ,
AttackType,Classi f ication, Priority)
Definition 2. Raw alert refers to a single aack action per-
formed by the aacker in the network. It may be an alarm generated
directly by the IDS system aer the scan of the host service or the
exploitation of a vulnerability of the host, without any processing.
Definition 3. An aack sequence is a sequence of IDS alerts
that is produced by an aacking process. We represent the aack
sequence as AS = {a1,a2, ...an }.
Alert Aggregation
We found that there are many aack type, source IP, destina-
tion IP, source port and destination port with the same or similar
alerts in a certain time window, which are recorded as ve-tuple
(AttackType, S IP ,D IP , S Port ,D Port). According to the specic
circumstances of the alert, this paper is divided into the following
modes:
a) (AttackType, S IP ,D IP , S Port ,D Port) are the same, that is
the same aack event is alerted multiple times.
b) (AttackType, S IP ,D IP , S Port) is the same, an aacker scans
the ports of another host and queries the services it runs.
c) (AttackType, S IP) is the same, D IP is on the same network
segment, and an aacker scans the target network segment to query
the surviving hosts.
d) e AttackType is dierent, S IP and D IP are same,that is
belongs to the springboard aack.
Bymergingmultiple alerts caused by the same security event into
one alert record, the alert aggregation can greatly reduce the num-
ber of raw alerts and reduce the number of alerts to be associated,
which can greatly reduce the time required for alert correlation.
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e complexity of the resulting multi-stage aack model is greatly
reduced. It is more conducive to us to explore the phenomenon of
”Feint Aack”.
We dened the Alert Aggregation Rate as follows:
Alert Aддreдation Rate =
Raw Alerts −Output Alerts
Raw Alerts
(1)
Attribute Similarity Calculation
• Aack Event e aack events in the IDS alerts are clas-
sied based on the IKC model. From the aacker’s point of
view, the aacks in the subsequent stages aremore complex
and more purposeful, and the acquired rights are higher.
In the aack event dimension, the similarity formula for
ai , aj belonging to an aack sequence is as follows:
Faler t event (ai ,aj ) =

1,∆α = 0or 1
e−(∆α−3/2),∆α > 1
0, else
(2)
∆α = α(ai .alert event) − α(aj .alert event)
Indicates the stage where the ai aack event is located,
indicating the dierence between the two alarms. If the
alarm is 0 or 1, the greater the similarity, the smaller the
similarity is. e upper limit of similarity is 1, and the
minimum is 0.
• IP Address We use the method of comparing the same
number of bits of an IP address to measure the similarity
of IP addresses.
FI P (ai ,aj ) = N32 (3)
where N =max{H (ai .sIP ,aj .dIP),H (ai .sIP ,aj .sIP),
H (ai .dIP ,aj .dIP)}
• Port e maximum value of the port is 65535, so the port
dierence value can be normalized to represent.
FPor t (ai ,aj ) = 1 − |p1 − p2|65535 (4)
• Timestamp In a multi-stage aacking process, the time
interval is relatively short when two aacks are in the
same phase, and the time interval may be longer when
two aacks occur in dierent phases, and when there is a
long latency following the previous access. For this reason,
we do not set time window for alert logs. e similarity
function of the timestamp property is as follows:
FT ime (ai ,aj ) = e−∆t
∆t = ai .time − aj .time .
(5)
e complete similarity is calculated using the following function:
F (ai ,aj ) =δaler t event Faler t event (ai ,aj ) + δipFip (ai ,aj )+
δpor t Fpor t (ai ,aj ) + δt imeFt ime (ai ,aj ) (6)
δ is the weight of the aribute value.
Scan the alert sets aer aggregating, analyze each alert ai in
turn, and calculate the membership degree of each classied result
of ai . e specic calculation method is to calculate the similarity
function of all alerts in ai and a cluster. e maximum degree of
similarity is used as the membership of this class of ai . Before
calculating the similarity, rst determine the aack event of the
alert with the latest timestamp in the cluster and the aack event
of ai , whether the number of stages corresponding to the aack
event of the laer is less than the number of stages corresponding
to the aack event of the former is greater than or equal to -1, if
it is greater than or equal to -1, we calculate the similarity of two
alerts using a similarity function with multidimensional aributes.
If less than -1, we calculate the membership of ai belonging to the
next cluster. e largest membership degree of ai belonging to the
existing clusters is r . When r is greater than the threshold value λ,
it is considered that the alerts in the clusters corresponding to the
alerts ai and r are triggered by the same aack process. If r is less
than the threshold value λ, ai is used as a new cluster, which may
be the beginning of a new aack process. e specic algorithm is
described as follows:
Algorithm: Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm Process
Input: Alerts = {a1,a2, ...,an }, and aack sequence set
ASS = ϕ
Output: Aack sequence set ASS = {AS1,AS2, ...,ASq },
where each aack sequence ASi =< a1,a2, ...,an >.
1©For each raw alert ai , calculate its membership to each aack
sequence ASi . If the aack sequence set ASS = {AS1,AS2, ...,ASq }
is empty, then make AS1 = {ai }, and repeat step 1©. If ASS is not
empty, then use AS1 in the ASS set in step 2©.
2©Scan aack sequence ASi =< a1,a2, ...,ak >. First determine
whether the phase of ASi (the phase in which the latest timestamp
inASi occurs). If the answer is yes, go to step 3©, and if the answer
is no, then go to step 4©.
3©Calculate the similarity between ai and each element in ASi
separately using the similarity function and use the maximum
value of the results as a membership degree of ai to ASi . If the
membership degree is greater than or equal to the preset threshold
value λ, then add ai to aack sequence ASi = {a1,a2, ...,ak ,ai }
and go to step 4©.
4©Take the next ASi in ASS , if it exists, repeat step 2©; if not, it
means that all the aack sequences in the ASS have been scanned.
If the membership degree of ai to every aack sequence is less
than λ, then create a new element ASr = {ai } and add ASr to
ASS = {AS1,AS2, ...,ASq ,ASr }, before going to step 5©.
5©Repeat step 1© to step 4© zbove until all Alerts are analyzed.
3.2 Building the Virtual-Real Lib
Definition 4. Virtual Aack and Real Aack: A virtual at-
tack is dened as an aack that is accurately identied by IDS or
an aack classier. A real aack is a more concealed aack (which
may be a normal behavior) or a new type of aack. e IDS does not
generate an alert or is judged to be a normal behavior by the classier.
e input to this section is the CICIDS2017 dataset, which has 83
statistical features such as duration, number of packets, number of
bytes, packet length and so on. e output is the classication result
of the aack, which lays the foundation for the next step of dividing
the virtual aacks and real aacks. It mainly studies existing aack
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detection algorithms and improves traditional deep learning meth-
ods for aack detection. Based on deep learning and few-shot deep
learning algorithms, the raw alerts are preprocessed by unbalanced
learning strategies, such as random downsampling and SMOTE
oversampling techniques, combined with deep convolutional neural
networks to select dataset features, and then through hierarchical
SVM classiers to build the optimal CICIDS2017 classier. e
network structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: CNN Architecture for Feature Extraction and SVM
for Classication
Index Layer Output ShapePad&Stride
1 Conv2D(32 lter,size:3×3) 10×10×32 1,1
2 Conv2D(32 lter,size:3×3) 10×10×32 1,1
3 Maxpooling2D 5×5×32 2,2
4 Conv2D(64 lter,size:3×3) 5×5×64 1,1
5 Conv2D(64 lter,size:3×3) 5×5×64 1,1
6 Flaen 1600 –
7 Fully Connected 512 –
8 SVM 5 –
e results of CICIDS2017 classier are ltered, and to enhance
the condence of the virtual aacks and real aacks, we selected
the aacks that were judged to be omissive judgement in ten tests,
that is, the aack events identied as normal events as real aack
sample set. e correctly classied aack events are used as a set
of virtual aack samples. e virtual aacks and real aacks are
respectively extracted from the original dataset and store them in
the le to form a virtual aack and real aack sample database,
that is, the basic element library of the aack chain construction,
we dened the concept of the virtual reality aack condence as
the probability virtual aack and real aack samples are judged as
normal event. e lower the probability value of the virtual aack,
the greater the probability that the aack is a virtual aack, and the
high probability value of the real aack indicates that the aacker
is more likely to be aacked by the aacker. e division of virtual
aacks and real aacks is shown in Table 2. e red background in
the table is real aacks, and the blue background is virtual aacks.
Table 2: Divide the virtual attack and real attack
Confusion Matrix Predicted Category RecallNormalProbe DoS U2L R2L
Actual Category
Normal 60352 123 103 9 6 0.996
Probe 387 3501 260 0 18 0.840
DoS 5686 82 224081 0 4 0.975
U2R 73 13 17 119 6 0.522
R2L 7018 4 6 1 9160 0.566
Precision 0.821 0.940 0.998 0.9220.996Acc:95.6%
Over-Sampling: SMOTE
Less class-sample combining oversampling technique referred
to as SMOTE algorithm, it is by Chawla.N [19], who proposed one
based on the traditional method of oversampling lile wood class
like a simple copy of the dierent new oversampling. In the training
data S , xi is the minority samples. e rst step to calculate the xi
similar k-nearest neighbor set Pi . From Pi random selection of a
sample, it may be set to xa , the dierence between the xi and xa
corresponding to the aribute q is denoted as di f f (q) = xaq − xiq .
It can be concluded that the synthesis of minority class of sample
fiq mathematical expressions is such as 7.
fiq = xi + (xaq − xiq ) ∗ rand(0, 1) (7)
where rand (0,1) is expressed the random number in (0,1). en
the operation of the above process is repeated according to the
beginning of the set of over sampling rate, and the synthesis of a new
minority sample is added to the initial training sample to increase
the number of minority samples. And the degree of imbalance will
greatly reduce and get the new training samples, then there is basic
balance between majority classes and minority classes in the new
training data set. get the new training sample multi class sample
and small sample in the number of basic balance. Finally, the new
training data set are classied by the classier and the results are
obtained. e process is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of SMOTE algorithm.
3.3 ”Feint Attack” Chains Construction and
Detection Model
Definition 5. ”Feint Aack” Chains: By analyzing the various
situations of ”Feint Aack”, it is summarized as a multi-stage aack
mode of virtual aacks and real aacks.
1) e aacker hides the aack trajectory, and sometimes uses
the method of ”make a feint to the east but aack in the west” to
perform a large number of aacks on the vital hostA, such as DDoS
aacks, generating a large number of alerts, while the real target
host is B. e operation and maintenance personnel handle the
DDoS for A. Aacks against B when the aack does not take into
account other alerts;
2)e aacker uses a highly concealed aack in some steps of the
multi-stage aack sequence, or uses an advanced aack to prevent
the IDS system from generating an alert to confuse the operation
andmaintenance personnel. e lack of some processes in themulti-
stage aack process, resulting in the inability to completely restore
the entire aack path (such as using DNS queries in LLDoS2.0
instead of IPsweep in LLoS1.0).
Our aack chain recovery technique which based on Bi-RNN.
We use the aack chain established in the rst stage and the real
aack in the second stage to embed the atomic aack event into
the aack chain through Bi-RNN coding to construct the aack
chain. e forward RNN records the information of the aack
5
Figure 3: ”Feint Attack” Chains Construction.
chain from the cause and the result, and the reverse RNN records
the information of the aack chain from the result to the cause to
ensure the maximum retention of the correlation information. e
process is shown in Figure 3.
Finally, we label the sample set of feint aack and non-feint
aack chains, and further classify the aack chain samples. Based
on the machine learning algorithm, a special aack detection model
based on the virtual aack and real aack chain is constructed by
training the feint aack and non-feint aack chain samples, and
the model parameters for the data set are determined. Further,
the learning model integration of specic weight enhancement is
carried out by voting method to improve the accuracy of model
detection. Finally, we achieve the purpose of accurately identifying
the ”Feint Aack”.
4 EXPERIMENTAL AND RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the experiment results and give a compre-
hensive evaluation of bidirectional RNN-based few-shot training
for detecting multi-stage aack model proposed in this paper.
4.1 Experimental Setup
A. Experimental Environment
We choose same hardware and soware congurations when
carrying out the experiments. Our experiment is conducted on
the operating system of windows 10 on the hardware environment
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7500U CPU, 8GB RAM and IT hard disk. We
utilize the programming language python 3.5. It can be found the
main items of our hardware and soware conguration in Table 3.
e network topology of DARPA2000 is shown in the following
Figure 4, where the network is divided into DMZ network and Inside
network.
Figure 4: DARPA2000 network topology.
B. Experimental Data
Algorithm: ”Feint Aacks” Construction and Detection Model
Input: the CICIDS2017 dataset
Output: the classier of the ”feint aack” chain
Step 1: Create CNN-SVM model 1
1. Add 1st and 2nd convolution layers with 32 lters of 3×3,
followed by max pooling layer of size 2×2.
2. Add 3rd and 4th convolution layers with 64 lters of 3×3,
followed by aen layer and the out put of which is a temp
vector of 1600×1.
3. Add fully connected to get a vector(512×1), followed by a
H-SVMs classier.
Step 2: Build the Virtual-Real Lib
For ten times of test in model 1
I f a aack is predicted to be Normal
add the aack with the probability of Normal to
Real Lib
Else i f a aack is predicted correctly
add the aack with the probability of Normal to
Virtual Lib
Sort Real Lib and Virtual Lib by probability in ascending and
descending order
Step 3: Create Bi-RNN model 2
1. Create a causal correlation matrix.
2. Construct aack chains based on the matrix.
3. Encode the aack chain using Bi-RNN.
Step 4: Create classier on ”feint chain” model 3
1. Divide training sets and test sets(8:2).
2. Train and validate model.
3. Test model.
Table 3: Hardware and Soware Conguration
No. Hardware or soware Type
1 Operating system Windows 10
2 Programming language Python3.5
3 Development environment JetBrains PyCharm 2018.1.4
4 CPU Inter(R) Core(TM)i7-7500U
5 RAM 8GB
6 Disk IT hard disk
• Sadmind Exploit for a DDoS Aack[DARPA2000]:
e DARPA2000 dataset is a collection of intrusion scenario
correlations from MIT Lincoln lab. It is widely used to verify the ef-
fectiveness of various alert event correlation algorithms. LLDOS1.0
includes a complete distributed deny service (DDOS) aack sce-
nario, the multi-stage aack consists of 5 steps. Detect, hack, install
trojan mstream DDoS programs and perform remote DDoS aacks
on target servers. e aack process is shown in Figure 5. e
aack mainly utilizes the buer overow vulnerability of the sad-
mind program on the solaris platform. As long as the aacker can
correctly nd out and overwrite the stack of the executing sadmind
program, the aacker can successfully invade the host and obtain
the manager from the remote. Permission to execute arbitrary
program code, including installing DDoS soware and launching
DDoS aacks.
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Figure 5: e attack scenario of LLDoS1.0.
• Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset [CICIDS2017]:
eCanadian Institute for Cybersecurity published the CICIDS2017
dataset in 2017. e advantage of this data: time is near, the bench-
mark data set covers the 11 criteria required, and all previous IDS
data sets cannot cover all 11 standards. Containing benign trac
and the latest common aacks, the data capture period begins at 9
am on Monday, July 3, 2017 and ends at 5 pm on Friday, July 7, 2017
for a total of 5 days. Monday is a normal day and only includes
benign trac. Aacks implemented include brute force FTP, brute
force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, web aack, inltration, botnet and
DDoS. ey are executed on Tuesday, Wednesday, ursday and
Friday.
C. Evaluation Criteria
ere are many evaluation indicators used in intrusion detection
systems. Although this paper only studies the multi-stage aack
identication, it also uses the commonly used indicators in the in-
trusion detection eld, namely the completeness rate and accuracy.
Suppose the total number of aacks included in the test data set is
N , the number of aacks identied by the recognition method is
RN , and the number of aacks identied in these test data sets is
actually R. e denitions of these indicators are as follows:
1) Completeness Rate: e completeness rate is the complete-
ness of the description method, that is, whether all aacks can be
found. e calculation method for multi-stage aack recognition
completeness rate is:
Completeness Rate = R/N (8)
2) Accuracy Rate: Accuracy rate is the correctness of the descrip-
tion method, that is, how many of the identied aacks are correct.
e calculation method for multi-stage aack recognition accuracy
is:
Accuracy Rate = R/RN (9)
4.2 Experimental Result and Evaluation
A. Alert Correlation Based on Fuzzy Clustering
Use the snort’s command sudo snort -r /LLS DDOS 1.0-inside.
dump -l /home -A fast -c /etc/snort/snort.conf in Linux to re-
play the original trac packets from LLDoS1.0 and LLDoS2.0 of
DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017. en, we got the raw alerts of snort
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: e Raw Alert of Snort.
rough the network trac packet analysis sowareWireshark,
we analyzed all trac packets (including normal background trac)
in the DMZ and Inside areas of LLoS1.0, and the packets containing
only aack trac in each of the ve aack phases of the DDoS
aack. e analysis results are shown in Figure 7. We tracked
Figure 7: e specic content of the attack trac packet in
wireshark.
the TCP ow of the key aack steps and saw that the aacker
performed a large number of IP sweep (ICMP echo request) on the
target network segment, among which 18 hosts survived (ICMP
echo reply). e next step is Sadmind ping, querying the Sadmind
vulnerability and verifying that the service is running on the surviv-
ing host. ere are 6 hosts that meet this condition. Buer overow
aacks on these 6 hosts invaded the host, and 3 hosts successfully
invaded, namely: 172.16.115.20, 172.16.112.10 and 172.16.112.50.
Log in to these three hosts using the rsh service telnet, upload and
install the DDoS Daemon (including mstream server and mstream
master). Among them, the aacker installed server and master on
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172.16.115.20, and only installed server on 172.16.112.10 and 172.16.
112.50. It can be seen that 172.16.115.20 is the jump host of the
aacker in the internal network. Finally, log in to 172.16.115.20,
check the port mstream daemon port 6723, execute the mstream
command, set the target IP to 131.84.1.31, and use the forged IP to
initiate the DDoS aack for 5s.
Combine the two-part alerts (DMZ: 7024 and Inside: 10145)
obtained by using snort, and perform alert aggregation on 17169
raw alerts to obtain 3222 alerts. e alert aggregation rate reaches
81.23%. e result is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Alert Aggregation
Raw Alerts Amount Aggregation Rate(%)
DMZ 7024 –
Inside 10145 –
Total 17169 –
Alert Aggregation 3222 81.23
Using the fuzzy clustering algorithm proposed in Section 3.1,
3222 alerts are clustered, and a total of 944 aack sequences are
obtained. It contains a large number of sequences of length 1
(indicating that there are a large number of fragmentation alerts in
the alert clustering).
Table 5: Attack type in Cluster A2
No. Attack type
1 ICMP PING
2 FTP Bad login
3 TELNET Bad Login
4 RPC sadmind UDP PING
5 RPC sadmind query with root credentials aempt UDP
6 RPC sadmind UDP NETMGT PROC SERVICE
CLIENT DOMAIN overow aempt
7 RSERVICES rsh root
8 SNMP request udp
9 BAD-TRAFFIC loopback trac
Aer deleting the sequence of length 1, a total of 195 multi-stage
aack sequences are obtained. Aer extracting the multi-stage
aack mode, nine sequence paerns are obtained. Among them,
the alerts including the multi-stage aack process in LLDOS1.0 are
shown in the following Table 5. It can be concluded that the aack
route is composed of three independent paths in Figure 8.
B. Building the Virtual-Real Lib
By using the downsampling and SMOTE algorithms, the number
of our data sets becomes as shown in Table 6.
e model using only CNN and using few-shot deep learning
model are shown in the Figure 9. It can be seen that CNN is easy to
cause over-ing, and the model of few-shot deep learning is used
to avoid over-ing.
e result of few-shot deep learning model is shown in Table 7.
We can see that ourmethod has signicantly improved the detection
rate of Minority class-sample (U2R and R2L).
Figure 8: e LLDoS attack process analyzed by Wireshark.
Figure 9: e iteration of the model.
We nd the fact that CNN-SVM with SMOTE get the best recall
and precision. CNN model without SMOTE has lower recall when
the classify U2R and R2L trac. e reason of that the amount of
U2R and R2L packages is too lower than other packages what we
have mentioned above. But the recall to U2R and R2L trac has
been greatly improved by introduced SMOTE. e result can be
seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Comparison of precision and recall.
e evaluation criteria of the number of iterations is shown in
Figure 11.
e Virtual-Real Lib contains 20,718 real aacks and 189,826
virtual aacks. In order to verify the reliability of our results, we
got all of real aacks and Normal to test, the results show that more
than 99% of the real aacks are missed as normal.
C. Build Feint Lib and Detect the ”Feint Aack”
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Table 6: Balanced dataset
Title of Dataset Data Classied
BenignDoSHulkPortScanDDoSDoSGoldenEyeFTP-PatatorSSH-PatatorDoSSlowLorisDoSSlowHTTP Test Bot BruteForceXSSInltrationSQLInjectionHeartbleed
Train Dataset 1886428 184858 127144 33468 8234 6350 4717 4636 4399 1572 1205 521 28 16 8
Pre-processed 17965 12323 8476 6693 8234 6350 4717 4636 4399 1572 1205 521 280 160 80
Table 7: e result of few-shot deep learning model
Confusion Matrix Predicted Category RecallBenignProbe DoS U2R R2L
Actual
Benign 60352 123 103 9 6 0.996
Probe 387 3501 260 0 18 0.840
DoS 5686 82 224081 0 4 0.975
U2R 73 13 17 119 6 0.522
R2L 7018 4 6 1 9160 0.566
Precision 0.821 0.940 0.998 0.9220.996Acc:0.96
Figure 11: e eect of the number of iterations on the ex-
perimental results.
Feint Lib contains 11758 records of ”Feint Aack” chains, and
there has 20 aacks in each record. e number of training sets
is 9408 and the number of testing sets is 2350. e dataset can be
seen in Figure 12. Label 1 means the chain is a ”Feint Aack” chain.
Label 0 means the chain is a common chain.
Figure 12: e Feint Lib.
e number of real aacks in the aack chain are 1 to 7. Among
them, the number of aack chains containing one real aack is
3371, the number of aack chains containing two real aacks is
3248, the number of aack chains containing three real aacks is
1811, the number of aack chains containing four real aacks is
672, the number of aack chains containing ve real aacks is 200,
the number of aack chains containing six real aacks is 50, the
number of aack chains containing seven real aacks is 11, and the
number of aack chains containing eight real aacks is one.
Finally, we chose best c = 0.5 and best д=1 to get the best acc =
78.8764% of cross validation. We got 75.23% accuracy on the test
set. It is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13: e result of detecting ”Feint Attack” chain.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, aiming at the ”Feint Aack” mode in APT aack,
we proposed new detection method which mainly utilizes fuzzy
clustering and Bi-RNN algorithm. Firstly, by analyzing the existing
”Feint Aack”, we dened virtual aacks and real aacks as the basic
aack events that constitute the ”Feint Aack” chain. In the aack
scenario, the fuzzy clustering method based on aribute similarity
is used to minemulti-stage aack chains. Amulti-stage aackmode
comparison library is formed, and a few-shot deep learning model is
dened and divided into virtual aacks and real aacks to construct
a dataset of atomic aack events. en, the atomic aack event
is embedded into the aack chain through Bi-RNN coding, and
the ”Feint Aack” chain is constructed to form the ”Feint Aack”
dataset. Finally, the aack chain samples containing the feint aack
behavior and the non-feint aack behavior are further classied
to achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the ”Feint Aack”.
Our innovation lies in the rst use of bidirectional RNN coding to
construct the aack chain to ensure maximum retention of causal
information. We veried our method by using the LLDoS1.0 and
LLDoS2.0 of DARPA2000 and CICIDS2017 of Canadian Institute for
Cybersecurity. e experimental results show that our method can
derive the multi-stage aack sequence from the alert correlation
by fuzzy clustering, and the ”Feint Aack” behavior is mined from
the aack chains. e aack sequence is encoded by Bi-RNN, and
achieve 75.23% accuracy to identify ”Feint Aack”.Research on the
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key technologies of behavior detection, and realize the prototype
system based on the virtual aack and real aack chain to achieve
zero breakthrough in detecting such aacks.
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